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INTRODUCTION

Skyrocketing markets that depend on purely psychic support
have invariably succumbed to thefinancial law of gravitation.
Unsustainableprices may persistfor years, but eventually they
reverse themselves. Such reversals come with the suddenness
of an earthquake; andthe bigger the binge the greaterthe
resulting hangover.
- Burton G. Malkiell
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Audrey McFarlane, Steven Ramirez, Nicola Sharpe, Cheryl Wade, and the other participants on
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Conference for their comments. Atiba Ellis, Joshua Fershee, Kendra Fershee, Peter Huang, Karen
Kunz, Elaine Wilson, and Yesha Yadav for their thoughts, comments and support. Also thanks to
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This year, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission") will have been in existence for 81 years. Founded in 1934, the
agency was created in the wake of the worst financial disaster in America's
history-one that came about largely as the result of speculative and
manipulative trading in its securities markets.2 Since its founding, one of the
SEC's central missions is to "protect investors." However, the model that the
Commission uses to serve that mandate can by and large be framed as a laissezfaire approach to regulation.4 Rather than directly intervene in the corporate
governance of a company, the SEC primarily uses a disclosure paradigm to
protect American investors. The disclosure model rests on the premise that "an
educated investor is a protected investor." 6 As such, the SEC model requires

I

BURTON

G. MALKIEL,

A RANDOM

WALK DowN

WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED

STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 37-38 (10th ed. 2011).
2
JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. MORGAN

143, 153 (2002). Although later, Prof. Markham
states that "it is difficult to isolate a single event that caused the stock market crash of 1929,"
certainly the speculative behavior by some of the country's top traders was a contributing factor.
Id. at 153. Of course, many of the issues that were at the heart of the Great Depression have
mutated into contributing factors of the financial crisis that hit between 2007 and 2009. See infra
Section III.B.
The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and FacilitatesCapitalFormation, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N [hereinafter Investor's Advocate],
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
4
There are many, of course, in the legal academia who would disagree with this
characterization of the SEC as being laissez-faire. In fact, many legal scholars today have faulted
Congress and the SEC for what they describe as the federalization of corporate governance. See,
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal CorporateGovernance Round II, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011). While it is true that some of the provisions of Dodd-Frank, SarbanesOxley, and the SEC's more recent rule making (in the realm of shareholder proposals and proxy
access) does show a keener interest in corporate governance issues, as I have argued elsewhere,
the underlying methodology that the SEC used to advance those issues is still, by and large, one
that is disclosure-based. Jena Martin Amerson, The SEC and Shareholder EmpowermentAnalyzing the New Proxy Regime and Its Impact on CorporateGovernance, 30 BANKING & FIN.
SER. POL'Y REP. 8 (2011). In addition, the SEC's most recent endeavors, in examining markets as
a whole (for instance through their creation of the Economic and Risk Analysis Division), is
precisely so notable because it is the exception.
5
Jennifer B. Lawrence & Jackson W. Prentice, The SEC Form 8-K: Full Disclosure or
Fully Diluted? The Quest for Improved FinancialMarket Transparency, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 913, 913 (2006) ("[O]ur results reflect the [SEC's] fundamental shift in the regulatory
model to one premised upon more disclosure, greater SEC involvement, heightened corporate
accountability, and an increased investor demand for market transparency.").
6
The SEC's investor website states that "information is the investor's best tool when it
comes to investing wisely." Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); see also The
TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970)

Basics of Saving and Investing: Investor Education 2020, W. VA. ST. AUDITOR'S OFF.,

http://www.wvsao.gov/securitiescommissionleducation/investored 2020.aspx (last visited Oct. 8,
2015) ("Investor education is a key component of our efforts and we sincerely believe that an
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companies to provide investors with a substantial amount of information
regarding its financial operations and financial well-being in the hope that
investors will use that information to make sound choices for their
investments.7
The problem with the disclosure system is that it does not work.

educated investor is a protected investor."). This mantra is repeated in other markets across the
globe. See, e.g., Investor Education: Overview, CAP. MKTS. AUTHORITY OF KENYA,
http://www.cma.or.ke/index.php/investor-education (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) ("We hold the
view that an educated investor is a protected investor and that a protected investor is always a
more willing player in the capital market place. To us, investor education is one of the most
effective regulatory tools.").
Other commentators also note that the SEC's regulatory model seems to rely almost
exclusively on disclosure. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1073 (2005). Professor Pritchard argues that the SEC has a "fixation with
disclosure" and uses disclosure as the panacea for all the ills of the securities markets. Id. at
1087. Pritchard also points out that "disclosure is the tool of choice largely because that is what
Congress has given the SEC." Id. at 1088. Both Professor Pritchard and this Article agree that
disclosure is a problem. However, while Professor Pritchard is focusing on disclosure as a
symptom of the SEC's problem as a regulator and its narrow focus and "group think" attitude,
this Article focuses on disclosure as an inappropriate response to the securities markets because it
no longer reflects the way the markets operate. In his article, Pritchard cites to another author,
Donald Langevoort, who notes that "the Commission has never studied investor behavior deeply
enough to say, publicly at least, what percentage of investors read or understand these
documents, or what influence the fundamental analysis-oriented disclosure has on their
investment decisions." Id. at 1088-89 n.53 (citing Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal
Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
135, 173 (2003)). Ironically, since the date of Langevoort's article, the SEC has publicly
discussed the low percentage of investors that read these documents; however, they have used
this low statistic simply as a way of stating that disclosure needs to be better, not questioning the
underlying assumption of whether disclosure should be used at all. Study Regarding Financial
Literacy Among Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Aug. 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-partl.pdf.
8
realize that by taking this stance I am wading into a space that is fraught with opinions
and controversy. For instance, many scholars believe that the disclosure paradigm is key to
making sure that investors have a baseline of confidence in the markets in order to feel confident
about investing in corporations. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities
Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 682-83
(2014) (discussing the historical impetus for the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act
as being designed to return investor confidence into the markets); Joshua Fershee, Activist
Shareholder and Law Prof: Robin Hood or Charles Pillsbury?, Bus. L. PROF BLOG (July 28,
2015), http://www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/business law/2015/07/activist-shareholder-andlaw-prof-in-merger-class-action.html (arguing that disclosure is the most efficient system for
regulating the markets); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failureand the Economic Casefor
a MandatoryDisclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984) (discussing the need for a mandatory
disclosure system within the context of an efficient capital market). According to Ramirez, "[fjull
disclosure of material facts backed by both public and private enforcement ultimately secured
investor confidence and therefore investment." Ramirez, supra, at 682-83. Because I join the
growing number of authors that express skepticism for the Efficient Market Hypothesis, I believe
that Professor Coffee's view of a mandated disclosure system is based on a fundamentally flawed
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Under this model, many of the SEC's biggest corporate scandals in the
last 20 years--ones that precipitated hundreds of millions of dollars in losses to
the markets and investors-would have been perfectly legal if the company had
disclosed what it was doing.? To be clear, the company could have still engaged
in the underlying practice, they just needed to tell the general public about it.
Enron,10 the analyst conflict scandals," and Goldman Sachs1 2 are all notable
premise. See infra Part III.B. In addition, while I understand and respect Professor Ramirez's
concern regarding disclosure as a way to maintain investor confidence, I fear that his solution to
make disclosure more effective and increase enforcement over companies that fail to accurately
disclose ignores the larger issue-that this is no longer how securities markets operate. In a
framework where the underlying corporate disclosures account for a very small amount (if any)
of a person's decision to buy a stock, having additional (even if more effective) disclosures still
misses the mark. Rather, it would seem that the better course of action would be to envision a
system that both keeps the pace with our current trading patterns while still providing a paradigm
that would allow people to feel confident enough to purchase securities in the market-even
without corporate disclosure. For my initial thoughts on such a schema, see infraPart III.B.
On the other side of the debate, there are scholars who contend (like I do) that disclosure is not a
workable model. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and
Shelf Registration:An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135, 179 n.210 (1984) (expressing
doubt over whether the required disclosure of the 1934 Act is effective); Henry T. C. Hu, Too
Complex to Depict? Innovation, "PureInformation, " and the SEC DisclosureParadigm,90 TEX.
L. REv. 1601, 1612 (2012) (arguing for "major changes to the longstanding federal regulatory
architecture itself"); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 (2004). Moreover, some studies have found that the disclosure
system has not worked from the beginning. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of
FederalRegulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & EcON. 613 (1981); Larry E.
Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REv. 77, 93 n.86 (2003) (citing George J. Benston, The
Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969)); Carol

J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of
New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 295 (1989); George J. Stigler, PublicRegulation of the Securities
Markets, 19 Bus. L. 721 (1964).
9
Of course, going down the "what if" path is always dangerous. For instance, it is quite
possible that the disclosure framework could lead other companies away from engaging in the
bad behavior in the first place-knowing that they would have to disclose it. In fact, that seems
to be the rationale behind the SEC's move to require companies to disclose whether or not they
have a Code of Ethics (rather than substantively require companies to adopt a Code of Ethics):
the act of disclosing that one does not have a Code of Ethics, should, in theory, lead to companies
adopting one. See Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2014); Code
of Ethics, 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2015). In passing the rule in 2003, the SEC stated:
The strength of U.S. financial markets depends on investor confidence.
Recent events involving allegations of misdeeds ... have undermined that
confidence .... It seems reasonable to expect that a company would hold its
chief executive officer .. . to at least the same standards of ethical conduct to
which it holds its senior financial officers.
Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-8177, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003).
1o
See, e.g., Michael Duffy, By the Sign of the Crooked E, TIME (Jan.
19, 2002),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,195268,00.html
("Enron and Andersen
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examples of scandals that were illegal, not because of the practice itself, but
because the corporation in question failed to disclose it. While the causes of
actions for these scandals often sound in fraud, the underlying factual claims
frequently rested on nondisclosure.' 3 Indeed, the whole legal theory at the heart
of a fraud cause of action arguably rests on nondisclosure, because in the end,
fraud is a deception. The deception only works if the actual truth is concealed.
Whether it is done through a material misrepresentation or simply an omission
is almost ancillary to the fact underlying the problem-that the real facts have
not been disclosed.
Enron, in particular, offers an insight into the failure of this regulatory
framework. To try to escape liability, many executives of Enron contended that
most of the questionable transactions that led to the company's collapse were in

officials hardly deny the dubious deals, the 881 offshore tax havens or the stupid accounting
tricks. That's partly because nobody can be sure that those dodges were inherently illegal."). In
an even more prescient article, Richard Cudahy and William Henderson discuss the Enron
collapse and note its similarity to a largely forgotten scandal of another energy titan-Samuel
Insull-that occurred over 70 years ago. Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From
Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26
ENERGY L.J. 35 (2005). According to Cudahy and Henderson, the main lesson to be learned from
this is "in recognizing that during a financial bubble driven by rapid changes in network
industries ... regulatory officials will inevitably buckle under political pressure .... [T]he laws
adopted in response to Enron are destined to be watered down and ignored during the next
boom." Id. at 37-38. Unfortunately, we did not have to wait for the next boom to see the full
impact of the lack of political pressure. See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and
Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309 (2002)
(noting the complex, yet arguably technically compliant disclosures made by the company).
"
See Jill E. Fisch, FiduciaryDuties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REv. 1083, 1084
(2007). The analyst conflict scandals emerged when it was shown that analysts were touting
stocks of a company without disclosing their conflict of interest: that their investment firm had
many of the touted companies as clients. Id.
12
According to the SEC's release on the matter:
Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) that hinged on the performance of subprime residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Goldman Sachs failed to disclose to
investors vital information about the CDO, in particular the role that a major
hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the
hedge fund had taken a short position against the CDO.
Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud in
Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm.
13
See, e.g., Second Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 $$ 21, 23, In re Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 99CV0151-L(NLS), 2000
WL 34612019 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2000) (discussing a fraudulent scheme to get an inhaler to
market by "falsely persuad[ing] investors" that Dura's sales were increasing and "concealing ...
problems" regarding the process").
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fact disclosed in various SEC filings. 14 It is undisputed that Enron's collapse
had significant ramifications, not just for the employees and suppliers but also
for the marketplace as a whole.15 However, if the executives' arguments are to
be believed, the collapse of Enron still would have occurred, with the SEC
having no recourse with which to seek redress for investors.' 6
Indeed, the public had access to Enron's copious SEC filings prior to
the company's collapse.1 7 Although, as the Honorable Richard D. Cudahy and
Professor William D. Henderson point out, "the presentation of this information
was hopelessly complex" to the point that it "made it impossible to gauge
Enron's true financial health," and such "deliberate lack of transparency hardly
dissuaded investors." 8 Similar to Samuel Insull's "shoddy financial
disclosures" in the 1920s that left over 600,000 shareholders bereft of their life
savings following the 1929 stock market crash,19 a rational investor in the
1990s should have concluded that there was insufficient information to
determine the business risk of investing in Enron and what "was available was
too impenetrable . .
[t]hus, Insull and Enron stock should have sold at a
discount rather than a premium.",2 0
More recently, the rise of computerized trading has made the
disconnect between the U.S. securities markets and the leading regulatory body

See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron Secretary Defends Her Criticismof Executives, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/business/businessspecial3/23enron.
html (noting that in the Enron board minutes, Herbert Winokur, head of the finance committee,
stated, "'neither Andy nor Enron did anything wrong' and that the company had 'disclosed
everything necessary').
15
See Uma V. Sridharan, Lori Dickes & W. Royce Caines, The Social Impact of Business
Failure:Enron, 17 AM. J. Bus. 11 (2002) (arguing that the Enron collapse had ramifications that
went beyond the impact to its employees and investors).
16
For another example, the market for high frequency trading shows the limits of the SEC's
power. The SEC has only recently made questionable methods used by high-frequency traders,
such as front running or naked access, illegal. See Abusive Trading Practices Prohibited, 17
C.F.R. § 38.152 (2015) (making front running illegal starting in 2012); Risk Management
Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 17 CFR § 240.15c3-5 (2015) (making
naked access illegal for individual traders as of 2010); see also Nathan D. Brown, Note, The Rise
ofHigh Frequency Trading: The Role Algorithms, and the Lack ofRegulations, Play in Today's
Stock Market, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 209, 220-21 (2012) (defining "front-running" as trading
long or short, knowing that others will soon take a position that would benefit their own, and
"naked access" as trading on exchanges using the broker's computer code without having to be
filtered through the broker's computer code); David D. Gruberg, Note, Decent Exposure: The
SEC's Lack ofAuthority and Restraint in Proposingto EliminateFlash Trading, 65 U. MIAMI L.
14

REv. 263 (2010).
Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 10, at 96.
Id.; see also Schwarcz, supra note 8.
19
Roger Lowenstein, Before There Was Enron, There Was Insull, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 19,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/business/yourmoney/19shelf.html.
20
Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 10, at 96; see also Schwarcz, supra note 8.
17
18
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that oversees them all the more alarming.2' By some accounts, high frequency
trading-that is, using complex algorithms and formulas to move in and out of
large volumes of stock-accounts for up to 70% of all trading volume on the
U.S. markets.22 And, while the current status of this market regulation is
generally open only to large institutional investors, the continuing advancement
in technology will soon make algorithmic trading something that is within
,23
anyone's grasp.
Moreover, while many of the symptoms of the practices that led to the
financial meltdown can be traced to deception and fraudulent behavior, the root
causes of the market meltdown of 2007 were completely divorced from the
issues that the SEC generally regulates under a disclosure model.24
Nevertheless, despite this disconnect between the underlying harm to
investors and its causes, the SEC still offers disclosure as the ultimate panacea
to the country's financial ailments. While the concept that knowledge is power
usually rings true, in the case of securities regulation, well-informed
shareholders in the United States are still, by and large, powerless-they are
simply aware of their powerlessness. 25 Equally true is that many shareholders
may be apathetic to the reality because they are solely interested in the

See David M. Serritella, High Speed Trading Begets High Speed Regulation: SEC
Response to Flash Crash, Rash, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 433 (2010).
22
Karen Kunz & Jena Martin, Into the Breech: The Increasing Gap Between Algorithmic
Trading and SecuritiesRegulation, 47 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 135, 135 (2015).
21

23

Id.

24

ScoTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED

WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 249 (Rick Horgan ed., 2010) ("The quants [are] also

&

haunted by another fear: systemic risk. The August 2007 meltdown showed that the quants'
presence in the market wasn't nearly as benign as they had believed."). One of Patterson's central
points in the book was the interconnectedness of all segments of the markets-those regulated by
the disclosure framework (such as securities) and those completely outside its structures (like
hedge funds). Id. at 238. "We are seeing things that were 25-standard-deviation events, several
days in a row." Id.
25
Indeed, many of the corporate governance movements of recent years reflect this growing
awareness that shareholders, as a whole, lack significant power over the company in which they
hold stock. For instance, the "say on pay" movement for executive compensation and increased
voting powers for director nominations seem to reflect this growing awareness. See generally
Larry Catd Backer, From Moral Obligation to InternationalLaw: Disclosure Systems, Markets
and the Regulation of MultinationalCorporations,39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 591 (2008) (discussing a
process-oriented approach to business and human rights issues). Professor Larry Backer takes the
position that, in order to truly hear the voices of those impacted, a process-oriented approach can
"serve as a vehicle for the enhancement of a market environment in which corporate
stakeholders ... might incorporate information about corporate 'social behavior' in their . .
decisions." Id. As such, transparency, process, and empowerment are intrinsically linked. All
three of these are particularly needed in the U.S. securities market. See Jena Martin Amerson, In
Praise of Process: Examining the SEC, Rule 14a-8(i)(8), and AFSCME v. AIG, 5 J. Bus.
TECH. L. 23 (2010).
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returns.26 The dual harms of apathy and ignorance put in question the
disclosure-based regime's ability to fix the underlying issues. 27
This Article argues that this current trend in market activity marks a
fundamental paradigm shift in trading habits. Instead of the traditional investor
paradigm-the old game--(where an investor's purchase of a stock is a
reflection of his confidence in the market), we have now moved to a consumer
paradigm-the new game-(where the purchase of stocks is not at all
connected to a valuation of the company" but rather to the value of the stock
itself and its currency within the market). 2 9 Given this transition, what is
needed is a regulatory structure (a new set of rules) that takes into account this
new trading framework.30 Specifically, this Article argues that we need to
develop a regulatory structure that embraces the stock as a product separate and
apart from its underlying corporation. In this way, we can devise a more nimble
regulatory configuration that addresses the markets as they are today rather
than the markets as they were prior to the advances in technology.
Part II of this Article examines this transition in trading habits and
discusses in more detail the shift between the investor paradigm and the
consumer paradigm. Part III juxtaposes this current model of trading with the
current system of regulation and, in doing so, exposes how out-of-step our
current regulatory models are from the way the markets behave. Finally, Part

Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 10.
There are two arguments that can be made about the challenges of the disclosure system.
One is that, while theoretically sound, the implementation, enforcement, and oversight of the
current structure is so flawed that it has become unworkable. The other, more ambitious
argument, is that the disclosure system itself, even if perfectly implemented, would still not be
the optimal way to regulate our markets. I tend to vacillate between the two camps. There might
have been a point at which an ideal disclosure system would have been enough (with robust
enforcement and oversight) to allow for market stability. Indeed, as Professor Ramirez points out,
the stability of our markets for decades could likely be traced to a robust disclosure based system
coupled with vigorous enforcement. See Ramirez, supra note 8. However, given the fundamental
(and I believe irrevocable) shift in our trading patterns, it would seem that the whole disclosure
system, at its core, is outmatched in every way for the challenges that lay ahead for our securities
market. For further discussion of this shift, see infra Part III.
28
This is underscored even more so by the current model of algorithmic trading that, by and
large, doesn't even take into consideration the individual company value so much as the
securities markets as a whole. For further discussion on algorithmic trading, see infra Part III.A.
29
while there have been many more articles in recent years, there have yet to be any that
intertwine market behavior (with its consumerism mentality) to the disclosure regulatory system.
Understanding this paradigm shift is crucial to understanding the necessary regulatory changes
that need to be implemented.
30
I am not the first person to address the question of whether the SEC's style of regulation
has become outdated. For instance, Professor Donald C. Langevoort has discussed the issue
within the rise of institutional investors. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and
the Institutionalizationof the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1026 (2009).
26
27
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IV examines other suggestions for regulating the market and sets forth some
preliminary thoughts on another potential way.
The aim here is not to provide a definitive answer to the regulatory
problem. Rather, the objective is to frame the conversation regarding what type
of fixes need to be made.3 While an overhaul of the current securities
regulatory system is arguably in order, there is likely not enough political
capital at this stage to warrant such a change (especially in light of the current
rulemaking avalanche that the SEC is still coping with in the wake of
Congress' response to the market meltdown-Dodd-Frank). 32 Therefore, this
Article aims to stimulate a conversation regarding what can be done in both the
long and short term so as to prevent other fissures within our regulatory
structure from widening into chasms and leading to another financial crisis,
greater than any before.33
II. THE CHANGING GAME

In the U.S. securities markets, the game has changed. In previous
generations, a securities purchase represented a person's investment in the
underlying company itself-a show of faith in the company's intrinsic value. 34

For instance, one of the issues that this Article does not assess is the current state of
exempt securities on the market and the resultant regulation. By its nature, private markets hit a
completely different demographic and investment aims. And, while any proposal for a shift in the
regulatory structure will by its nature also impact private securities (especially given the rise of
crowdfunding investment and the newly enacted regulations to address it), the analysis of how
this will impact those markets cannot be addressed here.
32
As of this writing, the SEC is currently dealing with 98 provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
that require SEC rulemaking action and "dozens of other provisions" providing the SEC with
discretionary rulemaking authority, of which it claims to have proposed or adopted threequarters. Implementing the Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last visited Oct. 8,
2015). At the start of 2012, it had finalized only 18 of the 98 rulemaking requirements and
missed 59 of its deadlines, with 21 future rulemaking deadlines pending. Of the 59 missed
deadlines, the SEC has released 53 of the proposed rules. Reese Darragh, SEC Ends 2011 Still
Well Behind Its Dodd-FrankSchedule, COMPLIANCE WEEK: THE FILING CABINET (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.complianceweek.com/sec-ends-2011-still-well-behind-its-dodd-frank-schedule/
article/221520/.
3
This last statement may seem rather dire; however, there are others who believe that there
is a strong potential for another crisis-one that could, in this case, lead to a total economic
collapse. See THE BIG ONE (Miramax Films 1997).
34
One of the ways that this was expressed was in discussions of the fundamentals of the
securities and how those fundamentals added value to the security that embodied it. See, e.g.,
Daniel Gross, Amazon Stock May Be Up, but the Company Still Doesn'tMake Any Money, THE
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 25, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/25/
amazon-stock-may-be-up-but-the-company-still-doesn-t-make-any-money.html;
Neil Irwin,
Twitter Could End Up Being Really Profitable. But It's a Super Risky Stock., WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/04/
31
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During that time, our markets were symbolized by the retail investor. 35 These
were individuals or families who would purchase a company's securities and
then hold onto them for years, if not decades, confident in the company's longAny profit that the investor realized in the short term
term performance.
came, not from selling a portion of his initial investment, but from dividends
that the company returned to the investor year after year.
Now, however, the trading patterns are unlike anything that has been
seen before. The shift largely divorces the purchase of the stock from an
interest in the corporation. There are a number of different reasons for this.
First, the players are different-retail investors have been replaced by large
institutional investors dominating the market. As it stands, the game benefits
the institutional investor over its retail counterpart. For instance, the nature of
the current disclosure system focuses on the sellers' disclosures (i.e., corporate
issuers who must disclose information so that investors can make a decision to
buy or sell). On the other hand, the institutional buyers, whose influence on and
share of the market is growing exponentially, are not under the same disclosure
obligations or scrutiny. Such one-sided oversight misses at least half of the
activity in the market, which arguably gives institutional players unrestrained
power over the market.
Second, the plays being called have changed dramatically. The rise of
computerized technology has allowed market players to trade in ways that

twitter-could-end-up-being-really-profitable-but-its-a-super-risky-stock/ (stating that at the time
of its IPO, Twitter was being valued at $13.6 billion, although it has never earned a profit); Trefis
Team, Why LinkedIn's Fundamentals Don't Support Its Share Price, FORBES: GREAT
SPECULATIONS (July 15, 2011, 12:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/201 1/
07/15/why-linkedins-fundamentals-dont-support-its-share-price/; Matthew Yglesias, The Prophet
ofNo Profit: How JeffBezos Won the Faithof Wall Street, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Jan. 30, 2014,
11:40 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/01/amazonearnings-how
jeff bezosgets investors to believe in him.html.
35
See MATTHIAS BURGHARDT, RETAIL INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS (Stefanie Brich & Anita Wilke eds., 2011) (arguing that retail investor trading is
important to financial institutions and the market).
36
Another aim of shareholders who held their stock over many quarters was to receive
corporate dividends. See Philip van Doom, Time to Sell Your Dividend Stocks? Not So Fast,
MARKETWATCH: INVESTING (Apr. 10, 2014, 11:11 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/

time-to-sell-your-dividend-stocks-not-so-fast-2014-04-10 (arguing that in the long run, dividends
make up the majority of returns in the market).
Paul Sullivan, Assessing the Value of Owning Dividend-Paying Stocks, N.Y. TIMES:
WEALTH MATTERS (June 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/your-money/stocks-andbonds/04wealth.html.
38
Deborah Fuhr, Institutional Investors Dominate the Market, FINANCIALNEWS (Oct. 21,
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2013-10-21/institutional-investors-dominate-the2013),
market.
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would have been impossible a few decades ago. 3 9 The use of algorithmic
trading formulas has only made this even more evident. 4 0 Finally, as we will
see in Part III, the scorecard itself has changed. Rather than focusing on the
fundamentals of a company and using that stock purchase as an investment in
that company, now market players are examining the value of the stock itself,
separate and apart from the underlying company.4 1 This disconnect, or
"disaggregation," between the security and the company is at the heart of the
new securities marketplace. 42 But first, this Part will examine the different
players and the different plays that are called.
A. Different Players
[The] Securities and Exchange Commission thinks of itselfas
the investors' advocate, by which it means retail investorsindividualsand households-asopposed to institutional
investors.
- Donald C. Langevoort43

The last three decades have witnessed a precipitous rise in the volume
of trading by institutional investors. There are a number of reasons for this.
First, with the gradual (and then explicit) lessening of regulation" in this area,

The advent of computerized trading has affected the retail markets as well. Clients who
39
were once required to call a broker to place an order can now simply go on-line to Ameritrade
and open up a securities account, effectively bypassing an intermediary who would advise them
on which stock to purchase. John Saunders, Lean Mean Times for Retail Brokers: Major
DiscountersHungrily EatingAway at Their Business, GLOBE & MAIL, July 6, 1990, at B2.
40
See, e.g., John Fullerton, High Frequency Trading Is a Blight on Markets that the Tobin
Tax Can Cure, THE GUARDIAN: EcON. (Apr. 4, 2014, 7:42 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
business/economics-blog/2014/apr/04/high-frequency-trading-markets-tobin-tax-financialtransactions-algorithms ("During 18 years with JP Morgan and for more than a decade since, I
have watched and participated in the inexorable transformation of the markets, enabled by
advances in technology.").
41

PATTERSON, supra note 24.

Even rampant speculation-a hallmark of the Roaring '20s-has morphed into something
completely different: computerized trading. See PATTERSON, supra note 24 (discussing how only
a small portion of market analysis by quant firms involves studying the fundamentals of a
company); Fullerton, supra note 40 (noting that "[o]ver time, these same quantitative trading
strategies became centres of speculative proprietary trading themselves, at times quite predatory
in nature").
Langevoort, supra note 30, at 1025.
43
In some cases, the securities "deregulation" can rather more aptly be named reduced or
4
modified regulation. Enron once again provides an example of this-part of why the company
underwent such turmoil is because previous California regulations that affected the company
were still in place while other regulations were removed. See Cudahy & Henderson, supra note
10.
42
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banks that once were confronted with an either/or investment plan were now
liberated to engage in both commercial and investment banking.4 5 Second, the
facility with which other institutions were able to engage in trading allowed
investment plans to enter the markets in unprecedented amounts (pension funds
and other institutional investors).46 Finally, the rise and proliferation of
computerized trading has made it an incredibly profitable venture for
institutions (like hedge funds) and investment banks to enter the market and
trade for their own benefit on a level that eclipses retail traders.47
Until 1993, most of the equity in the U.S. securities markets was not
held in the hands of institutional investors.4 8 Prior to that, equity still resided
mainly in the hands of retail investors. However, since then, the total amount of
equity held by institutional investors has skyrocketed.4 9
In his article, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalizationof
the Securities Markets, Professor Donald C. Langevoorto documents the
transition in the markets from a retail-driven to an institution-driven vehicle.
Langevoort writes: "The last thirty years or so have brought a rapid shift
towards institutionalization in the financial markets in the United States-in
other words, a shift toward investment by mutual funds, pension funds,
insurance companies, bank trust departments, and the like." 5 Langevoort notes
that this has led to what he terms "deretailization" in the markets, which, in
turn, has profound implications for regulation of the markets. 52

45
For a detailed discussion of the perils of deregulation in this context, see andr6 douglas
pond cummings, Still "Ain't No Glory in Pain":How the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
Other 1990s DeregulationFacilitatedthe Market Crash of2002, 12 FORDHAM. J. CORP. & FIN. L.
467 (2007).
46
Langevoort, supra note 30.
47
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH Boys: CRACKING THE MONEY CODE (2014).
48
Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, CorporateDirectors, and InstitutionalInvestment:
Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv 977, 977 (1993).
49
Fuhr, supra note 38.
50
Professor Donald Langevoort is a professor at Georgetown Law where he teaches courses
on Business Organizations, Securities Regulation, as well as various seminars on corporate and
securities law. For a full biography, see Donald C. Langevoort, GEO. L.,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/langevoort-donald-c.cfm# (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
s
Langevoort, supra note 30, at 1026.
52
Id. at 1027-28. In that regard, both Professor Langevoort and this Article share the opinion
that there are significant changes in the markets. Id. However, each examines these issues from a
different perspective. It seems that Professor Langevoort believes that the greatest cause of the
shift in the market has come from a change in the types of players and the causes. Id. While I
certainly believe that this is a significant part of the shift, I actually believe that the more
significant change has happened in how the markets, and particularly the products in the markets,
are being traded. It is this disaggregation that I believe has the most significant and the longest
impact.
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Certainly, Professor Langevoort is correct that the rise of the institution
as a principal player is a significant factor in the shift in our securities
markets. The sheer volume of the markets that the institutional participants
claim bear this out--current statistics show that institutional investors account
for more than half of the market participants in the United States, giving them a
huge power dynamic in the marketplace.5 4
Specifically, the dominance of institutional players has affected the
strategies in the market. As Langevoort notes, while an
investment
overall
increasing number of people invest in the securities markets, they do so
indirectly, using institutional investors (such as mutual funds and pension
funds) as intermediaries.55 In this way, institutional investors gain even more
power in the securities market because of the vast amount of wealth they
control by trading with other people's money.
At the forefront of the rise of the institution and the trends towards
purchasing stock as stock, stands the hedge fund. At its core, hedge funds are
organizations that pool and manage securities for a (usually) small and
incredibly wealthy group of investors. As one commentator rightly points out,
the prevailing themes that many use to characterize hedge funds are "secretive,
aggressive, anything-goes investors." 57 The dominance of these hedge funds
goes hand in hand with the dominance of algorithmic trading, and, because
hedge funds were largely left untouched by the SEC, these funds and their
investments have been allowed to grow by leaps and bounds.58

5

Langevoort, supra note 30.

54

See id.

Id. at 1072.
56
In fact, many of the reasons why hedge funds have been able to avoid SEC regulation is
because they have relied on this exemption by using the money of these wealthy (or
sophisticated) investors.
Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An
5
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CoRP. L. 681, 686 (2007).
58
As a result, the idea that hedge funds would be associated with corporate governance
seems at odds with the idea of algorithmic trading as the predominant form of investment for
hedge funds. And yet, this is the central thesis of Professor Thomas W. Briggs's article. Id.
Briggs makes the point that, in light of desultory returns in the early 2000s, hedge funds began to
engage in greater corporate governance activism in the companies in which they invest. Id. at
685. If what Briggs is saying is true, then that certainly undermines my theory; however, I
wonder how much of this involved a small handful of hedge funds, rather than becoming the
dominant trend. Id. Briggs himself alludes to this when he notes that there are a wide range of
investment styles that are captured in the term hedge funds (including "plain vanilla" hedge
funds). Id. at 686. Given this range, I wonder if that small amount of hedge fund activism was
merely an outlier or whether it did in fact mark a shift. I suspect we will need empirical studies to
confirm which way the wind actually blew.
It should also be noted that Briggs's article, while helpful, was not a statistically significant
analysis in that he did not point out how many of the total hedge funds were involved in activism,
he merely pointed out that some hedge funds were, and how. This doesn't answer the question
5
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As Professor Joel Seligman" states, our markets have "fundamentally
changed in recent decades while financial regulation has moved far more
slowly." 60 Yet despite this changing dynamic, the SEC's mode of regulation is
still too narrowly focused on a now largely marginalized class of investors and
their investments: the retail investors.
In short, the growing influence of institutional players cannot be
overstated.62 They have been key in the shifting paradigm. Their volume of
trading in the market has created the demand for new technologies to keep
pace.

posed in the present Article. In fact, Briggs's findings (which are eight years old) are not
statistically significant events. Also, it seems that the type of hedge funds that Briggs is
addressing does not fall into the type of hedge funds that would generally go into algorithmic
trading (Carl Icahn, Edward Lampert ESL Investments are examples of more traditional
investment pools, not ones that involve financial engineering). Id. at 696, 699. In the end,
Briggs's article, while interesting, seems to document more traditional behavior (one may even
call it quaint) rather than the behavior that most hedge funds demonstrate today, especially
because the article concludes that hedge funds "infrequently . . . get directly involved" in issues
of corporate governance. Id. at 708. Briggs is providing support for the idea that the principal
issue of the day in the 1970s was that "the principal concern had become how shareholders (the
owners) could control and monitor their agents (the directors and managers)." Id. at 710 (citing
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 308 (1976)); see also Morten Huse,
Accountability and Creating Accountability: A Framework for Exploring Behavioural
Perspectivesof CorporateGovernance, 16 BIUT. J. MGMT. S65, S70 (2005) ("Large corporations
were listed on stock exchanges around the world, corporate ownership became increasingly
global, and owners became faceless and impatient. Attention to market prices and quarterly
earnings replaced the attention to dividends.").
5
Joel Seligman is President of the University of Rochester, former dean and Ethan A. H.
Shepley University Professor of the Washington University School of Law, former dean and
Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law at the University of Arizona, and law professor at Michigan,
George Washington, and Northeastern. Office of the President: Joel Seligman, President and
CEO, University of Rochester, U. ROCHESTER, http://www.rochester.edu/president/bio.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2015).
60
Joel Seligman, The SEC in a Time of Discontinuity, 95 VA. L. REv. 667, 679
(2009).
Among the changes Seligman notes are the diversification of financial holding companies, the
globalization of securities trading, the expansion of instruments for securities trading, and the
increase in the number of investors in the market. Id. at 669-70. I would add to this three other
significant changes: (1) the rise of the institutional investor, (2) the increase in the use of
technology in investing, and (3) the changed behavior for investors' buying patterns for stocks.
61
See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 30, at 1026.
62
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEx. L. REV. 987, 995 (2010)
(documenting the rise of the institutional investor); see also Langevoort, supra note 30, at 1026
n.4 (discussing how over 72% of the trading in U.S. markets comes from institutional investors).
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B. DiferentPlays
In the last few decades, the amount of information and data that can be
processed has increased exponentially. Concomitant with this rise in storage
space is the speed with which it can be processed.6 3 While the data and how it
is used in the securities market have been advancing in an unprecedented
fashion, the technology necessary to complete these transactions has
simultaneously been shrinking.64 The sheer space needed to perform these
mighty calculations is minute compared to what was needed a generation ago.
As Professor Karen Kunz 65 and I commented in a previous article: "data
analyses that would have been nearly impossible a few decades ago (and even
then only with a number of supercomputers) can now take place on one's iPad
with a few swipes." 66 The disconnect between the changing players in the
markets and the SEC's outdated method of regulating is a significant symptom
of this new financial landscape. This change in the plays, in the way people are
trading, is another.
The rise in innovation and technology has led to another curious
consequence: the increased separation between man and machine. With the
sheer speed that many of these trades are occurring (where thousands of shares
are moved in less than a second), the "human factor"-a typical backstop
against, at minimum, computer glitches, or at most, flaws in formulas-has
been all but lost. 67 Hedge funds and other institutional investors have taken this
even further and allowed for the rise of computer trading-buy and sell orders
with huge volume being executed with very little human intervention or
oversight. As discussed below, this disaggregation has resulted in the
increasing prevalence of a consumer-driven (as opposed to investor-driven)
securities market.
Ironically, the traders who were responsible for the current market
structure may not even have the traditional MBA background. As some

63

LEWIS, supra note 47.

Kunz & Martin, supra note 22.
Professor Karen Kunz is an Associate Professor of Public Administration at West Virginia
University. Karen Kunz, DEP'T PUB. ADMIN., http://publicadmin.wvu.edulfaculty-staff/mpafaculty/karen-kunz (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) ("Her research interests include public finance and
fiscal policy, political economy, and financial markets regulation. In addition, Dr. Kunz brings
over 25 years of professional experience in the financial markets industry. She began her career
in the municipal bond market before starting one of the first female-owned consulting firms in
the industry. Her clients included institutional investors and traders, and boutique, regional and
multinational firms.").
66
Kunz & Martin, supra note 22, at 3.
67
One example of these consequences occurred during the 2010 flash crash, in which the
Dow Jones lost 1,000 points in minutes because of what was later discovered to be a computer
glitch. Ken Sweet, 'FlashCrash' Worries Go Global, CNN: MONEY (May 6, 2011, 11:09 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/06/markets/flashcrash/.
6

65
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scholars note, "[n]ot surprisingly, many of the most successful funds in [the
discipline of high frequency trading] have been founded by computer scientists,
mathematicians, and engineers, not by economists or fundamental stockpickers."6
As a result, the last few decades have seen a shift in the trading patterns
of the market. 69 No longer are a shareholder's investments in a company
primarily an indication of his belief in a company's fundamentals. 70 Now it is a
testament to how the shareholder believes the company will do as a security. I
In short, there is now a disaggregation in the securities market between the
company itself and the stock of that company. In fact, the corporation's
fundamentals represent only a small portion of what an institutional investor
will consider in deciding to trade that security. Consequently, the vast majority
of market movement is not dictated by public companies' disclosures, but is
instead based on quantitative formulas and inherent trading patterns. As will be
discussed in the next section, this changing pattern is marked by a
disaggregation between the security and the underlying company that it
represents.
III. A DIFFERENT SCORECARD
Traditionally, securities trading was based on an analysis that was
always tied to the underlying security. Certainly, for many financial
professionals, various theories were posited regarding trading patterns: whether
a buy, hold, or sell recommendation was in order. Commentators put forth
many different theories regarding how the market would behave or what the
trading patterns would be, but, at their heart, all of these theories were tied
directly to the fundamentals of an individual corporation (or even an industry).
A few years ago, that all began to change.
A.

The Rise of QuantitativeTrading

In the book, The Quants, reporter Scott Patterson discusses the source
of this change: the rise of quantitative analysis as a framework for trading in the
market.7 2 According to Patterson, this methodology was originally developed

6
Andrew W. Lo & Mark T. Mueller, WARNING: Physics Envy May Be Hazardous to Your
Wealth!, 2010 J. INv. MGMT. 1, 33, http://ssrn.com/abstract--1563882.
69
See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520,
520

(1990).
See also Kunz & Martin, supra note 22.
Under this model, the shareholder's purchase of stock may have very little to do with his
knowledge or faith in the company. Rather, his purchase could be the result of his belief that (for
whatever reason) that company's stock price will go up.
72
PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 40.
70
7
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by Ed Thorp, who first applied it to blackjack. However, it soon became clear
that this methodology could be translated into the securities arena, with
dramatic results.74
Quantitative trading is a type of computerized trading involving the
buying and selling of securities based on complex formulas and algorithms that
are tied to such varied indicators as the market as a whole, a particular industry,
or even, perhaps, the weather," rather than relying primarily on the
fundamentals of the underlying companies. Different forms of computerized
trading accomplish different goals. In one variant, computers are used to buy
and sell at a rapid pace, performing arbitrage7 6 between the bid and ask prices
(which can sometimes be distinguished by fractions of pennies). The frequency,
speed of transaction, and sheer volume represent the arbitrage that allows the
trader to make his money. One writer offers a succinct commentary on the
rise of computerized trading:
As part of a high frequency trading (HFT) strategy, computer
generated algorithms dominate daily trading volumes.

7

Id. at 14-15.

As Patterson notes, this transition was not always smooth. Id. For instance, many of the
74
most serious market glitches were, at least in some way, tied to the use of quantitative analysis.
7
The weather, of course, is not (one hopes) a primary factor for the algorithm process
trades. However, given the legendary secrecy that shrouds "quant shops" and their formulas, it is
hard to know what is in fact being used. See, e.g., James Aley, Wall Street's King Quant David
Shaw's Secret Formulas Pile Up Money. Now He Wants a Piece of the Net., FORTUNE MAG.
(Feb. 5, 1996), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/1996/02/05/207353
/index.htm. Aley discusses the quant shops' trading formulas as follows:
The secrecy [in the firm] is understandable when it comes to the firm's
proprietary technology-what Shaw calls "our life's blood." Shaw's marketbeating algorithms are so secret, even limited partners such as Morgan Miller
(one of Shaw's earliest investors and an executive at National Spinning Co.)
aren't entirely sure what's going on behind the curtain. "With most of the
investments I have, I understand exactly what's going on. I don't with
David," says Miller. "It does bother me in a way. But it's something I can
live with."
Id. See generally LEWIS, supra note 47; PATTERSON, supra note 24. Both Lewis and Patterson
have both done a very good job of capturing the secrecy involved in this sub-section of the
financial industry.
76
Arbitrage means buying securities or foreign currency in one market and nearly
simultaneously selling it in another market to profit from the difference in price. Arbitrage,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arbitrage (last visited Oct. 8,
2015).
The SEC's recent regulation on decimalization had the unintended consequence of making
77
this form of arbitrage even easier. See John Carney, SEC Rethinks the Penny Tick in Stock
Trading, CNBC: NETNET (Feb. 4, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100433013# ("A
task force formed in March 2012 found that decimalization had created an environment that
favored the stocks of companies with highly liquid, very large capitalizations at the expense of
smaller companies.").
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Algorithmic trading uses computer programs to enter trading
orders with the computer algorithm deciding aspects of the
order, such as the timing, price, and quantity of the order, or in
many cases, initiating the order without human intervention ....

HFT firms may hold their position for a very short horizon and
try to close the trading day in a neutral position. Therefore,
HFT must be a type of algorithmic trading, but algorithmic
trading need not be HFT."
Algorithmic trading itself has now been incorporated into the securities
industry at an institutional level, representing the dominant trading model at
most hedge funds and being a significant part of the curriculum for a financial
engineering degree. The premise behind algorithmic trading and its ascent into
securities markets is based on the fundamental belief of many of its adherents
that the market is run by a mathematical "truth" (creatively named the "Truth").
The perfect trading formula is one that captures this inherent truth of the
markets and uses that truth to yield high returns for investors. The Truth,
simply stated, is "a universal secret about the [w]ay the market worked that
could only be discovered through . . . the study of obscure [mathematical]
patterns in the market." 79 As such, many traders in today's markets are on a
quest to find the formula that encapsulates that Truth and insulates its wielders
from significant market failure.s
The pinnacle of the shift came with the institutionalization of this
methodology at the academic level.8 ' By the turn of the century, financial
engineering programs that endeavored to develop algorithmic trading patterns
were proliferating across the country.82 These graduates, in turn, either went to
work for large institutional investors (usually brokerage firms or hedge funds)
or began to set up their own shop-getting investors to fund millions upon
millions of dollars into these new trading models with the potential for
incredible returns.
Other indicia that the paradigm has changed from one of an investor to
that of a consumer model is that the importance of dividends seems to have
dwindled in the last few decades.84 With a few noteworthy exceptions (Apple,

7

Brown, supra note 16, at 209 (citations omitted).
PAT-TERSON, supra note 24, at 8.

8

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id
Id.

83
84

Huse, supra note 58.
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Inc.8 ' being the primary one), purchasers of securities rarely make their
86
decisions based on the dividends that will be paid out by the company.
Quantitative firms are notoriously secretive about the formulas and
data needed to execute these strategies. 7 The formulas, once created, are
protected with the same intensity and paranoia as some of the highest held trade
secrets 88 or top level government security information.8 9 As such, the derivation
of these formulas and their processes have come to be known as the black
box-trading patterns where unknown quantities and data sets are entered and
high yields are produced and spat out on the other side. 90 The only thing that is
clear is that the amount of data being processed through these funds is
enormous.91
Outsiders, therefore, know very little regarding what type of
information is used for these formulas. However, what has become clear is that
not much of the information relates to the corporation to which the security is
attached. 9 2 What the corporation is doing, what its long-term prospects are,
what its fundamentals or balance sheets contain matter very little (if at all) for
these formulas.93 In fact, given that many HFTs require that the position be
liquefied at the end of each day of trading, one can see why the long-term
fundamentals of a company would have very little to do with the actual
trading. 94
This disaggregation is at the heart of the shift from an investor
paradigm to a consumer paradigm. Since it is clear that traders are buying stock
for reasons that are fundamentally different than traditional retail investors, the
investment prospects of the corporation, then the logical conclusion is that they

8

See Jeff Reeves, Apple Stock Has Discovered Gravity-But Don't Sell, SLANT (Nov. 6,

2012, 6:00 AM), http://slant.investorplace.com/2012/1 1/apple-stock-has-discovered-gravity-butdont-sell-aapl/.
86
Huse, supra note 58.
87

See generally RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK Box: THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT

QUANTITATIVE TRADING (Arzhang Kamarei ed., 2009).
88
PATTERSON, supra note 24.
89

Id.
So much so that the strategies have earned themselves nicknames such as "black box" or
"dark pools" (two similar, but distinct, concepts). Rishi K. Narang defines the former as, "any
system that is fed inputs and produces outputs, but whose inner workings are either unknown or
unknowable." NARANG, supra note 87, at 12 (emphasis added). In contrast, a dark pool is a
mechanism that allows investors to shield their trades from the view of the securities markets
allowing "investors operating with the dark pool [to] have access to information about a potential
trade that other investors using public quotations do not." Brown, supra note 16, at 217.
90

91

NARANG, supra note 87.

92

Id

9

Id

94

Id
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are purchasing the particular stock solely for its gains-for its value as a
product that is divorced from the company rather than as a proxy for the
company itself.
Even more telling is Google's recent decision regarding the classes of
stock that they offer. Traditionally, corporations have offered stock that allows
stockholders to exercise voting rights. Google, in 2014, decided to issue a new
class of stock, one that has no voting rights attached to it.95
This habit of buying and selling the thing itself is much more
characteristic of a consumer rather than an investor. The trader is purchasing
the stock for its value today and then selling the stock (like an informed
connoisseur) before the value decreases. Admittedly, this is a fast-paced
version of the consumer model but a version nonetheless. 9 6
The disconnect between an equity's position in the securities market
and the underlying company's position in the overall commercial market is
increasingly being recognized. For instance, one author reports that, "[e]quity
markets are full of companies with powerful positions and sluggish stock
prices."9 The changed pattern of trading allows for traders to leverage bad
performing assets and can ensure liquidity in the markets. However, these
benefits can only be seen if the models-the formulas on which trades are
based-perform as predicted. The 2009 financial crisis revealed the flaw in this
thinking.
B.

The FinancialCrisis

The 2007-2009 financial crisis was deemed by many to be a black
swan-a statistically unpredictable disaster that, in the words of one
commentator, "occur[s] so infrequently that they are virtually impossible to
analyze using standard statistical inference."9 However, to others, this merely

&

9
For Google, this is merely another step forward on the continuum. During their IPO,
Google issued a different class of stock that, in effect, made sure that its founders stayed in
control.
96
The idea of thinking of financial products similar to tangible products (like a toaster) is not
without precedent. For instance, in 2008, Senator Elizabeth Warren (who was, at the time, a
Professor at Harvard Law School) and Oren Bar-Gill (an Associate Professor at NYU Law)
wrote an article extending the notion of product safety beyond merely physical products to
financial products (which, for Warren and Bar-Gill were credit products). The authors' position,
as stated in the article, was that much in the same way that all physical products undergo a safety
review, this type of framework should be extended to credit products. See Oren Bar-Gill
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (2008). In the end, thinking of
purchasing stocks from a consumer rather than an investment paradigm opens up a whole new
framework for re-imagining regulation of the stock markets.
97
Todd Zenger, What Is the Theory of Your Firm?, HARV. Bus. REv. (June 2013),
http://hbr.org/2013/06/what-is-the-theory-of-your-firm/ar/pr.
9
Lo & Mueller, supra note 68, at 37.
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highlighted the flawed nature of the statistical prediction model of market
performance and, in particular, its heavy reliance on the rational investor.
Indeed, even financial engineers acknowledge the impact of behavioral
economics on trading decisions. As Andrew W. Lo and Mark T. Mueller state,
"the incentive structures of hedge funds, proprietary trading desks, and most
non-financial corporations have a non-trivial impact on the attendant risks those
financial institutions face."99 In other words, traders at these firms are often
motivated not by gains to the market but by short-term greed to make decisions
that affect millions. 0 0
Moreover, the traditional use of hedging (leveraging against one
security by buying another security with offsetting risks in order to diversify an
inventor's portfolio) has now become an end in and of itself rather than a
means to maintain a stable portfolio.10 1 In other words, while hedging used to
be the way to create diversification, now hedging has simply become a new
way to play the markets to get at the Truth of the market-and it would seem to
create money where none existed before.1 0 2
All of these factors have combined to bring us to the point where
disaggregation has now been embedded, on an institutional level, with the
securities markets. 03 As a result, the shift from an investor paradigm to a
consumer paradigm appears to be complete. Given this, having a market that is
regulated by disclosure, which seems to only consider the investor paradigm, is
dangerously out of step.
Not only does this paradigm shift the nature of regulation, but it also
has serious ramifications for the underlying economic and legal theories upon
which it is based. For instance, for years, scholars (and the courts) have
advanced the Efficient Market Hypothesis ("EMH") as a way of understanding
(and, in some cases, monitoring) the securities markets. At its core, the efficient
market posits that markets are so efficient that the trading price of a share
accurately incorporates all of the current information about that stock. Some
versions of EMH believe that such is the level of efficiency in the markets that
any stock at any given time will accurately reflect the historical and current
information about that company regardless of whether that information is

99

Id. at 47.

1oo

This greed may be rational and even benefit the market; however, when self-interest rather
than market performance for investors motivates trades, this leads to a classic agency conflict
issue, where traders may, in fact, put their own interests ahead of those upon whose behalf they
are investing.
101
Used in the way it was during the financial crisis, leveraging becomes another form of
speculative trading. For further discussion on the role of hedging and its contribution to the crisis,
see James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global FinancialCrisis:A CriticalAssessment of the

'New FinancialArchitecture' (Univ. Mass., Dep't Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-14, 2008).
102

LEWIS, supra note 47.

103

Henry G. Manne, In Defense ofInsider Trading, 44 HARv. Bus. REv. 113 (1966).
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public or non-public. In essence, the market knows all and your stock price
knows what to do with that knowledge. 10 4
In the end, the financial crisis brought to the forefront the debate in
other parts of the academy regarding the role of quants and the relevance of the
efficient market hypothesis.1' As one scholar noted,
Those who rail against the quants and blame them for the crisis
believe that market behavior cannot be quantified and financial
decisions are best left to individuals with experience and
discretion. Those who defend quants insist that markets are
efficient and the actions of arbitrageurs impose certain
mathematical relationships among prices that can be modeled,
measured, and managed. 1

As Lo and Mueller write, "no statistical method can fully capture
wholesale changes in financial institutions and discrete structural shifts in
business conditions.", 07 Therefore, in response to the rapidly changing game,
the question remains: what, if anything, has been done to ensure fairness in the
market?
C. Different Game-Same Rules

Notably silent from the previous section has been any mention
regarding the SEC's role in this changing market. That is because, by and large,

104
Of course, this idea of EMH is impacted greatly by what the market knows. For instance,
it would seem that the level of efficiency that is tied to stock markets must, by definition, be
related to stock prices. For support that the Efficient Market Hypothesis is no longer a valid
claim, see Brian Milner, Sun Finally Sets on Notion that Markets Are Rational, GLOBE & MAIL
(July 3, 2009, 7:40 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investment-ideas/sunfinally-sets-on-notion-that-markets-are-rationallarticle4301916/ ("Nothing in the hypothesis can

explain speculative bubbles and busts, bizarre stock valuations and the inconvenient truth that
some shrewd investors can indeed do better than the market."); see also JUSTIN Fox, THE MYTH
OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET

(2009).
According to Milner, the efficient market hypothesis has been "largely discredited," and
yet, many academics still discuss it, and many professors are still teaching it. See Milner, supra;
see, e.g., STEPHEN J. CHOI & ADAM C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND

ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2015). Milner also credits proponents of the EMH for "conjur[ing] up the
wonderful world of derivatives, securitized mortgages and the like." Milner, supra. While the
implications of the EMH have huge potential ramifications, a fuller discussion of these
consequences is outside the scope of this article. Id.
105
Cf Bainbridge, supra note 4 (stating that past market actions are wholly disconnected
from the future).
106
Lo & Mueller, supra note 68, at 1; Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and the
Management andRegulation ofFinancialInstitutions, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 461 (1995).
107

Lo & Mueller, supra note 68, at 34.
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there has been no role for the octogenarian agency. Throughout history, there
have been repeated instances of games changing before the rules caught up
with the new form of play. One can only hope that the SEC's longstanding
disclosure mission will also fall into this pattern-being seen later as a quaint
system that can now be called antiquated.
As outlined above, there are many issues that disclosure can no longer
catch. In addition, it appears that disclosure no longer functions to help the SEC
with its primary mandate to protect investors by ensuring equal access to
08
information, which is then used by investors to make informed decisions.
Investor protection however, is not the SEC's only stated mission. In
fact, the SEC's mission, stated in full, is to "protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation."'1 09 As Professor
Barbara Black points out, this mission statement "identifies several strategic
goals that include enforcing the federal securities laws, establishing effective
regulation of trading markets and their participants, and facilitating investors'
access to information."" 0 Having a number of distinct priorities in its mission
statement has often led to tension at the SEC when one priority seemingly
comes into conflict with another."' Nevertheless, the SEC's mission is not
fundamentally the problem. Or, more specifically, a new pattern of regulation
could be instituted that could do a better job of fulfilling the SEC's mission. Or
the mission itself could change.
Recently, even the SEC seems to be finally coming to the
understanding that a strict disclosure model may not be enough. In 2010, the
SEC proposed rules that set the stage for a potential shift (albeit an incredibly
gradual one) from a primarily disclosure-based model to one that is more
attuned to the market as a whole. The SEC issued a Concept Releasell 2 that

More recently, the SEC has expanded its focus for investor protection beyond its
traditional scope. Typically, the SEC's investigative focus is on corporations or individuals who
either falsely disseminate or omit material information. Recently, however, the SEC has
expanded its investigative reach by bringing fraud charges against a quant manager. According to
108

the SEC, the quant manager failed to disclose an erroneous calculation that affected the fund's

formulas and calculations. While this may be a step in the right direction in that it focuses on key
players that have heretofore been left out of many of the SEC's investigative focus-namely the

-

players in quantitative analysis-it is still mired in the old paradigm because it is still based on a
fraud and, therefore, a disclosure model. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Charges Quant Manager with Fraud (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011
189.htm.
109

Investor'sAdvocate, supra note 3.

110

Barbara Black, Introduction: The SEC at 75, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 445, 447 (2009).

I'

Id. at 448.

The SEC publishes Concept Releases to solicit comments from the public on a given
subject to ascertain the need for future rules. SEC Concept Releases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
112
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requested feedback on high frequency trading.1 13 In the wake of the financial
crisis, the SEC began to examine high frequency trading. One reporter wrote:
Federal securities regulators are examining whether some
sophisticated, rapid-fire trading firms have used their close
links to computerized stock exchanges to gain an unfair
advantage over other investors . . . . The SEC probe illustrates
a bigger push by regulators to examine less transparent parts of
the securities markets, such as the fast-growing area of so
114
called high frequency trading.
On March 8, 2013, the SEC took additional steps to address a more
holistic market solution. The proposed rule, Regulation Systems Compliance
and Integrity (Regulation SCI), provides a set of enforceable rules for other
market participants that require them to "carefully design, develop, test,
maintain, and surveil systems that are integral to their operations. The proposed
rules would require them to ensure their core technology meets certain
standards, conduct business continuity testing, and provide certain notifications
in the event of systems disruptions and other events.""' The primary goal of
the rule is to provide some stability to the use of market participants'
relationship with technology and the impact of this technology on the market as
a whole."
The regulation is a step forward in that it specifically acknowledges
and attempts to address the new players (high frequency traders), their new
plays (the use of computerized trading), and the impacts these have on the
game as whole. However, the proposed regulation does not go nearly far

113
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3461358 (Jan. 14, 2010).
114
Scott Patterson & Jean Eaglesham, SEC Probes Rapid Trading, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23,
2012, at Al. While the SEC's initial probe seems promising, the information may be stifled from
the disclosure paradigm within which the SEC is primarily working. Under this framework, the
SEC must examine whether information dissymmetries hurt investors, rather than examine
whether or not the markets as a whole are hurt. This idea of protecting investors can be
particularly problematic when it is the big investors themselves who are practicing the trading
that can lead to market failure. Most trading by retail investors do not carry this risk. Notice how
even with this conceptual release (and the discussion of high frequency trading), the perspective
that the SEC is using is still a disclosure one. As a result, the SEC's analysis potentially misses a
whole avenue of regulation and its ability to impact markets. In contrast, its most recent
proposals with Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity moves the discussion beyond mere
disclosure, but these are still, at best, an incomplete solution.
115
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Proposes Rules to Improve Systems
Compliance and Integrity (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1365171513148.
116
Zachary J. Ziliak, Regulation Ahead: Advice and Options for Automated and HighFrequency Traders, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.bna.com/regulation-ahead-adviceand-options-for-automated-and-high-frequency-traders/.
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enough to address the systemic way in which these changes have
fundamentally altered the game. Allowing for these fixes will, at most, provide
a superficial and temporary solution that amounts to little more than treating the
symptoms rather than finding a cure.
Further, on a micro level, the SEC tends not to focus on long-range
patterns and practices. For example, former Secretary for the SEC Jonathan
Katz notes that until 2009, "the SEC ha[d] never recruited, hired, and retained
skilled people capable of performing quantitative analysis.""'7 Katz also
observes that two of the biggest scandals of the previous decades were
uncovered, not by staff at the Division of Enforcement, but by academics,
going through publicly available information (in one instance, SEC filings)."'
As Katz notes, "[t]he SEC does not itself routinely analyze [those] or other
filings in this way," and concludes that "[a] regulator and the investing public
must accept the fact that all frauds cannot be prevented, and that it is not always
possible to detect them before they explode."' 1
Katz's assessment is correct. As someone with an insider's perspective
from the SEC, 20 I can firmly say that given the resources allocated to the
agency and the potential for fraud, it is inevitable that fraud will occur.1 2 1 But,
that is all the more reason to change the game.
Instead of making fraud prevention its primary (or seemingly
sometimes its sole mission), the SEC should instead focus on market stability.

"
Jonathan G. Katz, Reviewing the SEC, Reinvigoratingthe SEC, 71 U. PIrr. L. REv. 489,
501 (2010). In 2009, the SEC created the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis ("DERA").
According to the SEC, DERA was created to integrate financial economics and rigorous data
analytics into the core mission of the SEC. The Division is involved across the entire range of
SEC activities, including policy-making, rule-making, enforcement, and examination. As the
agency's "think tank," DERA relies on a variety of academic disciplines, quantitative and nonquantitative approaches and knowledge of market institutions and practices to help the
Commission approach complex matters in a fresh light. DERA also assists in the Comnmission's
efforts to identify, analyze and respond to risks and trends, including those associated with new
financial products and strategies. Through the range and nature of its activities, DERA serves the
crucial function of promoting collaborative efforts throughout the agency and breaking through
silos that might otherwise limit the impact of the agency's institutional expertise. About the
Division

of

Economic

and

Risk

Analysis,

U.S.

SEC.

&

ExCH.

COMM'N,

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). While DERA seems to be a
step in the right direction, the SEC is still using these tools and goals within the current
regulatory framework. In the end, if the SEC is still looking at regulating through issuer
disclosures rather than on a more quantitative, proactive basis, all of the data in the world will not
get at the heart of the problem.
118
Katz, supra note 117, at 496.
119
Id.
120
The Author worked as an attorney for the SEC's Division of Enforcement from 20002005.
121
Indeed, even with unlimited resources, there will always be someone out there who is
smart enough to outwit the regulators and to stay ahead of the game.
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Having a quick way of reacting to the markets seems to be more in line with the
trading patterns of today. While focusing on fraud is a laudable goal, focusing
on the market would have a greater impact.122
IV. CHANGING THE RULES-TOWARDS A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO
REGULATION

Given the inherent trading patterns that have emerged in the last few
years, it seems clear that, just as there is a disaggregation between the company
as a company and the company as an investment vehicle, there is also a
disaggregation between how people are trading in the markets and how the
government is regulating the markets. Under a disclosure model, the SEC is
regulating the wrong behavior. At its core, the disclosure model focuses on the
fundamentals of a company when, in fact, the current securities markets have
very little to do with a company's fundamentals. 12 3

122
One of Katz's solutions to what he labels as the problematic "DNA" of the SEC is to have
the SEC develop the capacity to engage in empirical analysis. Katz, supra note 117, at 501.
However, since the article's publication, that seems to have changed. Currently, the SEC's
homepage has a link to a market structure page, which, according to the SEC is there "to promote
better understanding of our equity markets and equity market structure through the use of data
and analytics." Market Structure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/
marketstructure/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). The website allows users to "[r]eview current staff
market structure research, use interactive data visualization tools to explore a variety of advanced
market metrics produced from the Commission's Market Information Data and Analytics System
(MIDAS), download dozens of datasets to perform your own analyses, and further the dialogue
through public feedback." Id. Katz's other proposals, including reorganizing the current structure
of the SEC, also have merit. As Katz sees it, there should be one division that would "regulate
retail market operations (business conduct) and a second division to regulate market structure and
operations as well as firm safety and soundness (prudential regulation)." Katz, supra note 117, at
511. The idea, according to Katz, is modeled after the Australian "twin peaks" regulatory
structure. Id. One of Katz's final comments was that disclosure needed to get back to basics. As
Katz notes, "the concept of disclosure has metamorphosed from the goal of providing investors
with documents containing clear and comprehensive information into documents containing
highly legalistic and all-encompassing statements designed to protect the issuer from future
litigation." Id. at 515. Clearly, Katz is correct in his assessment of the current disclosure regime.
However, the issue arguably goes deeper than that. Even if one were to correct for the disclosure
to make things easier for people to learn about a company, the issue would remain unresolved
because-in short-no one's listening. Quantitative traders are not trading primarily on corporate
information or corporate disclosures. They are trading on market information and market
disclosures. They are allowing the markets to set the price of a stock as separate and apart from
the value of the underlying issuer. Making what the issuer has to say clearer is, in essence, too
little too late.
123
The irony is that, under the mantra of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich.
1919), the raison d'6tre for the company itself is to serve as a profit maximizing machine for its
shareholders. Now, however, it seems that we have become too impatient and are unwilling to
rely on companies to achieve those ends for us. Instead we are using the securities markets as a
means to achieve those ends for ourselves.
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There are a number of different ways that the SEC (and other
regulators who have similar missions) can approach regulation. In a recent
article, Professor Kunz and I proposed a number of potential frameworks that
can be advanced to allow for regulation:
Of primary importance is the question of who, or what, is
being regulated. The model currently in place emphasizes
oversight of corporate disclosure, which allows for easy
identification of who is being regulated, but it limits oversight
to a very narrow spectrum of market participants and seems to
ignore the "what" portion of the equation. Any meaningful
attempt at acclimating to this new trading environment must
involve a seismic shift in the nature of regulation itself. To this
end we identify three possible perspectives of viable regulatory
paradigms that warrant further discussion and analysis. The
first is of a regulatory structure that focuses exclusively on
markets. The second is of a regulatory structure that focuses on
the market participants, and the final consideration is of a
regulatory structure that treats securities themselves as separate
products from their corporate producer and regulates them as
such. 124
The three types of regulation would each advance the regulatory
structure forward. However, whole market regulation (or, more precisely, a
holistic approach to regulating the markets) would encompass all three of the
perspectives (and whatever else is needed to bring about market stability).
Admittedly, this style of regulation is furthest from what we currently use. Yet,
it also is the style of regulation that would have the best chance of success.
Therefore, this Part of the Article will advocate for a new paradigm to examine
securities regulation: whole market regulation. Under this approach, the focus
shifts from regulating individual companies to regulating the market as a
whole-its participants, its products but particularly, its systems, to make sure
that market stability is maintained. Using this perspective when analyzing the
SEC's current regulatory framework can offer some stark insights into where
our system of regulation is going wrong and how we can make it better.
A.

A WordAbout Whole Market Regulation

Whole market regulation, at its core, focuses on systemic risk. Under
this paradigm, the overall trading framework and patterns are examined.
Traditionally, under our regulatory structure, the focus of regulation has been
on the players involved in the markets. Within this framework, corporations
have traditionally garnered the most regulatory ardor with other players

124

Kunz & Martin, supra note 22, at 12.
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(brokerage firms, market makers, exchanges, and the like) also being
considered but less centrally so. Investors, for the most part, have been
traditionally exempt from regulatory purview. In contrast, under a whole
market scheme-the focus shifts from the players to the game. Under this new
schema, any party (or player) can be subject to regulatory intervention, if they
are seen as rigging the game. This would allow the SEC to be more nimble and
proactive. Under this new schema, the agency would be able to engage in any
action as appropriate in order to maintain fairness and integrity in the markets.
The advantage of a whole market system of market regulation is that it
starts with where the market currently is: it can work with the consumer
paradigm while still allowing for a mixed framework that goes beyond a
consumer paradigm. In short, market regulation would change as the market
changes; it would be flexible and adaptable. However, in order to do so, the
SEC would need to be given sufficient delegated authority to adjust as the
market adjusts. Given how fast the world has moved and continues to move,
giving the SEC the tools to adapt is crucial.
The idea that systemic risk should be at the heart of our analysis in the
equities markets is a late addition to the legal academic literature. Now,
however, there is a growing consensus among legal academics that systemic
risk must be a part of any analysis of legal responses to our corporate and
securities structure, whether through changes to corporate governance1 2 5 or
through changes to the securities market. 12 6 Risk assessment as it pertains to the
securities markets seems central to the analysis.
If nothing else, the financial crisis has shown that risk assessment
needs to include systemic risks, not just the risk of individual sectors or
corporations. Rather, the meltdown in 2007-2009 highlighted just how
interdependent the markets were. Indeed, this can be most vividly shown in
comparing how a corporation's stock did in the wake of the financial crisis with
the corporation's internal health during that same period of time. However, the
seeds for this disaggregation between the stock and a company's value were
sown long ago. One of the most well-covered examples can be seen in the rise
of Amazon.com in the 1990s. Analysts were initially flummoxed by the steady
rise in Amazon stock for a period of at least 12 years,1 2 7 despite the company
125
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Payingfor Long-Term Performance, 158
U. PA. L. REv. 1915 (2010); Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate
Persona,2013 U. ILL. L. REv. 785.
126
See, e.g., Brett McDonnell, DampeningFinancialRegulatory Cycles, 65 FLA. L. REv. 1597
(2013). Nonetheless, in order to be transformative to our regulatory agencies, the scholarship
needs to examine three things: (1) the current trading patterns in the United States; (2) the current
holding patterns of stock in the United States; and (3) the current state of systemic risk and risk
assessment in the securities markets in the United States. To my knowledge, there is no
scholarship in the legal academy that addresses all three issues.
127
See generally Interactive Stock Chart: AMZN, YAHOO!: FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/
echarts?s=amzn+Interactive (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
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never having posted a profit. While some of this could certainly be attributed to
the company's potential (which has certainly proven true), it could also be seen
as a complete disaggregation between the stock of the company and the
company itself.' 28
Given then that risk assessment should be an integral part of the view
of securities markets, how, then, do we quantify it? Many argue that the
difficulty in calculating these risks means that this avenue should not be
pursued. In the end, though, uncertainty does not mean unknown. Thus, there
should be a number of tools that can be employed to project how the markets
will do and in what way they need to be regulated beyond simply using
disclosure.
This new solution does not completely dismiss the role of corporate
scandals and corporate mismanagement-of course there is validity to the truth
that some of the hits to the markets have occurred because of corporate
mismanagement and that regulatory disclosure may, in fact, have prevented
even more hits from happening. Still, there are two responses: first, the market
seems better able, as a whole, to recover when the damage is done through
individual corporate scandals (even when it's wave after wave of individual
corporate scandals). 12 9 Second, there is no reason to assume that under another
type of regulation-one that focuses on the market as a whole instead of on
individual entities-we could not have achieved the same or an even better
result than under a disclosure model. In short, an alternative regulatory
structure could not only achieve many of the same ends as a disclosure-based
system, but also build upon those achievements to get to something greater.
In the end, the solution has to be something that offers additional
benefits that disclosure currently does not.1 30 How the SEC fits into this
analysis, however, is worth further examination.
B.

What, Then, for the SEC?

The challenge of regulation in a rapidly changing world is not confined
to the SEC. Nonetheless, the sheer breadth of what the SEC must regulate is

128
According to news reports from the time, there were many reasons for Amazon's
successful IPO. For instance, the 2001/2002 market was particularly favorable for technological
stocks. In addition, commentators felt that Amazon was "riding an IPO resurgence that has
reclaimed the market. . . ." Dawn Kawamoto, Amazon.com IPO Skyrockets, CNET (Jan. 2, 2002,
4:43 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-com-ipo-skyrockets/. In the end, much of
Amazon's successful launch can be attributed to timing more than corporate promise or
fundamentals.
129
For instance, after the wave of accounting fraud scandals with Tyco, Enron, and
Worldcom, the market as a whole still continued to climb.
130
This Article does not attempt to answer these questions. Rather, I argue that there are
many other potential solutions. Instead, my modest contribution is to argue that disclosure is both
ineffective and onerous. Adding more disclosure will not make it more effective.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 9

88

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

enough to give one pause. The SEC, while not the exclusive regulator, is
certainly the lead regulator of the U.S. securities markets. The securities
markets are the heart of the financial market here in the United States, which is,
in turn, at the heart of American economic stability. As such, how the SEC
regulates (or fails to regulate) has a direct impact on the stability of American
lives-as the financial crisis brought into stark light. Moreover, the markets
that are subject to SEC regulation are arguably undergoing the most innovation
in recent years. This is a potentially combustible combination, akin to a dodo
bird watching over an android robot.
Flash trading provides a particularly stark contrast in the pace between
regulators and the world that they regulate. Flash trading, a form of HFT,
occurs when, after an order is placed by an investor, the exchange flashes the
order for a split second to its members within the exchange. This gives the HFT
firms a fraction of a second to decide and then execute the order. 13 1 If they
choose not to exercise on the stock, then it will go out to the market at large.
This type of trading is particularly advantageous to HFT because they can
move through these orders with ridiculous speed.
To many, this gives flash traders an unfair advantage because the
practice could be considered front-running. 13 2 It is unfair to the investors
because they will not get the best price, 13 3 and it is unfair to the market because
the HFT firms can use this information edge to trade ahead of pending
orders. 13 4 Others claim that flash trading provides liquidity to the market. One
thing everyone agrees on, however, is that flash trading is, well, fast.
In contrast, the SEC works at a much slower pace. Given the nature of
government agencies and their attendant bureaucracies, the regulator's response
time to an event could be considered quick if it were mere months. 135 Even
when confronted with fast moving issues (such as technological malfunctions
in the market), the SEC's reaction speed is eclipsed by the speed with which
the initial event (and resulting consequences) takes place.
The 2010 flash crash is one example of this. An SEC Regulator, when
talking about the flash crash stated,
I don't think I found out about this in real-time, so this was
probably a half an hour later, or an hour later. There's nothing
that one can do in the middle of the day, . . . there's no button

James J. Angel et al., Equity Trading in the 21st Century, 1 Q.J. FIN. 1 (2011).
Id at 29-30.
133
Id at 27, 29-30.
134
Id. at 30.
135
The SEC's rulemaking process is one example of this. Most regulations take months (or
sometimes years) to be implemented.
131
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that we can press that says hey, stop, stop what's going on, so
the markets are going to move the way the markets move.1 36
In a market with over one billion shares traded per day,'3 7 the losses that can
occur when there is "no button to press" can be disastrous. However, moving
beyond a disclosure-based regime to one that can track the markets as a whole
and even respond with deliberate speed would be able to match the
technological advances. 38

There are many people who believe that the SEC's disclosure
framework, despite its flaws, is still the best method for regulating the
securities markets. For those proponents of a disclosure regime, the regulatory
environment has secured the rights for investors in such a way that the
investors now have a baseline of accountability. Under this analysis, the
disclosure model diminishes the concern that companies will engage in rampant
fraud because they know that there is a certain line below which they cannot
fall.
This is a legitimate point. The theory behind disclosure is that it instills
faith in the markets by providing a common denominator of information that all
investors can access. Taking that information away would breed inherent
mistrust in the system and lead to either investors discounting the price of
securities (for the inevitable fraud that will occur) or leaving the markets
entirely. However, one of the benefits of a whole market system is that it
minimizes the need for corporations to engage in fraud. Once investors
understand that the market is being examined as a whole, it might instead instill
confidence to buy securities, but only if investors understand that they are
buying securities as products, not securities as investments in companies.
Corporations, in turn, would be freed from the onuses of disclosure
requirements that lead to many of the corporate pressures that often produce
fraud. So long as we divine a system' 39 that allows regulators to examine
markets as a whole, combined with a rapid response system that allows them to
intervene quickly in issues that could lead to wide systemic impacts, then a
system of accountability can be maintained even under a whole market

136
Money and Speed: Inside the Black Box (VPRO Backlight), YOUTUBE (Dec. 13, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aqlLnlUCoEU.
137
Even when the market is undergoing relatively mild trading losses, the sheer volume that
this represents often ranges in the billions. See Daily Market Summary, NASDAQTRADER.COM,
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=DailyMarketSurmnary (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
When there are actual corrections or unusual volatility, the results are even worse.
138
To be clear, this would be a radical change from our present structure. However, it is not
without precedent in our federal government. For instance, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA") has "quick response" teams for emerging crises. Community Emergency
Response Teams, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/community-emergency-response-teams (last
visited Sept. 17, 2015).
139
The details of this new system are beyond the scope of this Article.
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structure of regulation. Moreover, if the SEC has more time to regulate the
market as a whole, then it can devote itself to activities like quantitative
analysis of the market as a whole, which may uncover fraudulent behavior. 140
Allowing for this new framework of disaggregation would provide
another benefit: it would free corporations from the current profit maximization
model that is predominate here in the United States and allow corporations the
freedom to develop their corporate structure in ways they would like without
being beholden to shareholders. Under this model it would be made clear that
the shareholders are not buying an investment (or an ownership interest) in the
company, but rather purchasing the stock on its own. Doing so would then
allow other models to exist that are more mindful of socially conscious ideas
(such as the current rise of B-Corps or LC3 business entities), while at the same
time allowing for more traditional corporate structures to consider issues such
as business and human rights issues without fear that it might result in a shortterm price drop.
David Gruberg makes the point that not all market processes that affect
the price of a security fall within the court's definition of "deception" in
securities regulation.141 This point in fact strengthens why there needs to be a
new form of regulation. As mentioned earlier, many of the trading practices
that relate to a disclosure system (i.e., were properly conducted within the
disclosure system) were nonetheless the same practices that led to the financial
crisis. If part of the SEC's mission were to protect the markets (which is not
currently a part of its mission), then the practices that right now are legal but
still unstable would be analyzed from a completely different framework.
Instead of asking "does this provide adequate enough disclosure to protect
investors," the relevant query could be whether this protects the market as a
whole.' 42 As such, under this proposed framework, all of the unstable (but
legal) market practices would, in fact, be challenged and, hopefully, new ways
would be designed to ensure market stability.
The markets,1 43 in their wisdom, might already be stepping towards a
"beyond disclosure regime." For example, "tracking stock," in the world of
140
Cf Katz, supra note 117, at 496 (noting that the discovery of major frauds came from
academics who analyzed data from SEC filings and stating that "[t]he SEC does not itself
routinely analyze these or other filings in this way").
141
Gruberg, supra note 16, at 272.
142
Also look at North Dakota's Publicly Traded Corporations Act-they have a statutory
program to give investors more access and control. See North Dakota Publicly Traded
Corporations Act, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-35 (2007).
143
In addition to the markets, other government agencies have recognized that the financial
regulatory system in the United States needs to be overhauled. For instance, in the initial wake of
the current financial crisis, the Department of Treasury released a report entitled Blueprintfor a
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure. Press Release, Dep't of the Treasury, The
Department of Treasury Blueprint for a Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar. 2008),
the
Although
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
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securities, is a relatively new and (still) underwritten phenomenon. Tracking
stock is stock that is issued by a company that relates (or tracks) to one
particular division of the issuer. 1" The issuer (and, to some extent, the parent
company's shareholders) still retains control over the division and the
management of that division; however, the money that is generated from that
corporate issuance is separated on the financials and allocated simply to that
specific division.1 4 5 In their article, Peter H. Huangl46 and Michael S. Knoll1 4 7
present a number of different ways that tracking stock can be used, such as
reducing agency costs (by aligning investors with specific division incentives)
and separating out divisions whose financials are more opaque (and therefore
difficult to value and allow for specific stock-based incentives for managers of
that unit).1 48
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

This new approach is not without its challenges. Because of the
fundamental shift that would need to take place, there are many challenges
(both seen and unseen) that will inevitably rise when this amount of disruption
is put into the system. While addressing all these challenges is beyond the
scope of this Article, below I provide a few highlighted issues (that I hope
others will wrestle with) and offer my preliminary thoughts on the matter.
At its core, a paradigm shift of this magnitude requires us to question,
at the most fundamental level, the purpose of securities regulation. For
instance, when we discuss regulating the securities markets we often use the
adage of "protecting investors," but what does that look like when investors
themselves are causing the problems in the securities markets? As mentioned
earlier, investors are not a "one size fits all" commodity. Different investors
have different power bases and are thus able to access and leverage the markets
differently. How then do we maintain a regulatory structure that takes into
account all of the different market participants and their ability to affect the
market (for good or for ill)?
report contains sweeping and far-reaching recommendations, Professor Seligman forecasted that
the report would most likely not be adopted. Seligman, supra note 60, at 673. Indeed some of the
proposal recommendations are more than likely made moot by the Dodd-Frank Act. For instance,
Treasury's recommendation that there be created a Conduct of Business Regulatory Agency
which would, in part, have a role in consumer protection, seems to have become subsumed
within the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
1" For a fuller discussion of tracking stock, see Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll,
CorporateFinance, CorporateLaw andFinance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 175, 187-88 (2000).
145
Id
146
Id
147

Id
Id. Tracking stock, however, might have another unintended consequence, namely the
further separation of the security from the underlying asset.
148
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A similar question relates to the beneficiaries of the markets.
Specifically, who are the intended beneficiaries supposed to be-the capital
markets?l 4 If it is the investors, what does that lead to? As Professor Barbara
Black has stated "[e]ven a hypothetical single purpose of investor protection
presents the question of what investors the agency should be protecting,
because investors are not a monolithic group with identical interests."150
Finally, translating these issues within the current regulatory environment
would require an examination of our current structures from a critical, indeed a
surgical, standpoint in which we have not yet engaged. For instance, the impact
of whole market regulation goes to the heart not only of what we regulate but,
moreover, the process by which we regulate. Currently, our general approach to
regulation can be seen as top-down. Some scholars have reflected on the
inadequacy of this approach to financial regulation. For instance, Professor
Olufunmilayo Arewa has noted, "[c]urrent financial market regulatory
structures often reflect top-down approaches. Sources of financial market risk,
however, may go much deeper in organizations, including down to the level of
individual traders embedded in highly complex networks.""' Similarly, the
intended beneficiaries of the financial regulation that is being produced are
often much more deeply embedded in the economy and the community than the
promulgators of this top-down approach are aware.
Another thing to keep in mind is that very little about what caused the
financial crisis could be linked back to the things that the disclosure regime is
designed to regulate. Instead, the financial crisis was caused by bad securities,
but what does that mean-bad securities? How they are packaged? The value
of the underlying asset and industry? If so, then having a regulatory system that
acknowledges securities as a product (largely divorced from the company) may
be a way to understand what we value.
There is a strong need in the securities market for a comprehensive
regulatory framework that takes into account not just the securities market as an
149
Pritchard seems to be arguing that, in addition to the wrongdoers, the regulation should
focus on the investors themselves and the decisions that they make, particularly the decisions
with regard to a lack of diversification. As Pritchard notes (rather cynically), "[p]olicy will
continue to focus on throwing the books at the wrongdoers." Pritchard, supra note 7, at 1098.
Iso
Black, supra note 110, at 448. Although the typical delineation between investors is
usually done between retail and institutional investors, Professor Black has another interesting
take on the type of variety there can be among investors. She points out that:

Current shareholders in a corporation, for example, may not want the
managers to disclose publicly the corporation's current financial difficulties
because it would result in decreased stock prices and might further damage
the corporation. Potential investors in the corporation, conversely, want
timely, forthright disclosure of all information material to an assessment of
the corporation's prospects.
Id.
151
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, FinancialMarkets and Networks-Implications for Financial
Market Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 613, 624 (2009).
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investment paradigm, but also the securities market as a consumer paradigm-a
regulatory framework that takes into account the systemic risks of the markets
rather than the individualistic risks of public corporations. Otherwise, we run
the risk of leaving untreated the causes that created the financial crisis.
Changing our structure would require an engagement with all pieces from a
thoughtful and open viewpoint. Truthfully, there have not been many instances
of success with such a fundamental approach. But that doesn't mean it should
keep us out of the game.
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